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Abstract
Background: Corruption is widespread in Nigeria’s health sector but the reasons why it exists and persists are poorly 
understood and it is often seen as intractable. We describe a consensus building exercise in which we asked health 
workers and policy-makers to identify and prioritise feasible responses to corruption in the Nigerian health sector.
Methods: We employed three sequential activities. First, a narrative literature review identified which types of corruption 
are reported in the Nigerian health system. Second, we asked 21 frontline health workers to add to what was found in the 
review (based on their own experiences) and prioritise them, based on their significance and the feasibility of assessing 
them, by means of a consensus building exercise using a Nominal Group Technique (NGT). Third, we presented their 
assessments in a meeting of 25 policy-makers to offer their views on the practicality of implementing appropriate 
measures.
Results: Participants identified 49 corrupt practices from the literature review and their own experience as most 
important in the Nigerian health system. The NGT prioritised: absenteeism, procurement-related corruption, under-
the-counter payments, health financing-related corruption, and employment-related corruption. This largely reflected 
findings from the literature review, except for the greater emphasis on employment-related corruption from the NGT. 
Absenteeism, Informal payments and employment-related corruption were seen as most feasible to tackle. Frontline 
workers and policy-makers agreed that tackling corrupt practices requires a range of approaches. 
Conclusion: Corruption is recognized in Nigeria as widespread but often seems insurmountable. We show how a 
structured approach can achieve consensus among multiple stakeholders, a crucial first step in mobilizing action to 
address corruption. 
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Implications for policy makers
• Though corruption may seem intractable, identifying the most damaging types of corruption and their drivers is a crucial step in tackling 
corruption.
• Our Nominal Group Technique (NGT) approach blended contributions from frontline health workers, top health managers, policy-makers, 
and diverse stakeholders including anti-corruption and international agencies, to gain a panoramic understanding and proffer solutions to 
health-sector corruption in Nigeria.
• Findings support that the application of vertical and horizontal approaches is necessary to reduce corruption in the health sector.
Implications for the public
Corruption in the health sector contributes to poor service delivery which amounts to the loss of lives and other resources. Developing countries 
such as Nigeria often face the challenge of corruption and the hopes of eliminating corruption are often low. Our study involved health workers 
who identified the specific types of corruption that are very damaging to the health sector in Nigeria. Health workers also indicated the types of 
corruption that can be easily tackled, and ranked them in the order of priority. We got policy-makers to discuss these forms of corruption, and offer 
potential solutions that could tackle them. Solutions to the identified corruption types involved actions that can be driven by government structures/
authorities and actions that can be enforced by horizontally by everyday people.
Key Messages 
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Background
Corruption has been defined as the abuse of entrusted power, 
such that a person, group, or organization acquires undue 
benefits. These may be financial, material, or non-material.1 
Health systems are especially susceptible,2,3 often with life 
threatening consequences. Yet corruption in the health 
sector is often seen as intractable. A first step in addressing 
this issue is to identify the spectrum of corrupt activities, the 
actors involved, and those who have a stake in tackling it.4 We 
describe how we achieved consensus on the most important 
types of corruption in the Nigerian health sector and potential 
ways to tackle them. 
Corruption in any health sector is propagated and 
sustained by a complex web of interacting factors.5-8 It thrives 
where frontline workers are poorly paid and lack resources 
to meet the needs of their patients, in settings characterized 
by weak governance structures and processes, lack of 
transparency, and ineffective accountability mechanisms.5-8 It 
is especially common among those involved in procurement 
of resources where oversight is weak.9 Many types of health 
sector corruption can become normalized, through custom 
and practice, even while those involved accept, even if not 
openly, that it is unjust and risks health. It is facilitated by 
the invisibility, other than to those directly involved, of 
many healthcare interactions, compounded by power and 
information asymmetry between providers and consumers of 
care.10 
Nigeria ranks 148th out of 180 countries on the Transparency 
International 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index.11 Its health 
sector has been identified as one of its most corrupt sectors.2 
This has been attributed to weak governance structures and 
accountability.12 Several studies have implicated corruption 
in adverse health outcomes,13 and it features frequently in 
studies of barriers to effective care.1,7,8,12,14 It is now attracting 
much discussion in the Nigerian health policy arena, with 
the media portraying it as a threat to Nigeria’s achievement 
of the health-related Sustainable Development Goals.15,16 If 
these concerns are to be turned into action, however, it is 
necessary to achieve a consensus on the most harmful types 
of corruption and what can be done about them. 
Traditionally, scholars and activists have advocated measures 
to improve accountability and transparency throughout the 
health system. These can be vertical or horizontal. Vertical 
approaches involve promulgating rules and regulations to 
create accountability, provide checks and balances, and both 
sticks (dismissal, fines, etc) and carrots (incentives, perks or 
recognition for complying with regulations, etc). Horizontal 
approaches include collective agreements, codes of conduct, 
or informal contracts between health workers and managers 
forged by professional organisations, labour unions, 
community champions or grassroots movements. However, 
the evidence of effectiveness of these measures is weak.1 
Measures such as barring gifts from the pharmaceutical 
industry to health workers, enhanced internal control 
procedures in community health centers, and regularization 
of co-payments combined with action against informal 
payments have had mixed results.1,17,18 
Context is important. Despite its intuitive appeal, measures 
to increase transparency and accountability may bring few 
benefits where the ability of authorities to enforce rules is 
limited and key actors see few advantages when rules are 
enforced.19 A more pragmatic approach drawing on political 
economy and institutional economics,19 provides two insights 
for future directions in anti-corruption interventions. First, 
some forms of corruption are much more detrimental to the 
functioning of public services than others, so health gains 
from targeting them are likely to be very high. Second, some 
are deeply entrenched, serving the interests of powerful 
individuals and groups, requiring major political change that 
is difficult to achieve. 
We report a study that sought to redress corruption by 
synthesizing the evidence on health sector corruption in 
Nigeria, capturing the types of corruption and their main 
manifestations, as well as the factors that drive them. We then 
sought consensus on priorities for action, considering the 
significance of each type of corruption and the feasibility of 
solutions. 
Methods
The most detrimental corrupt practices in the Nigerian 
health system were identified systematically. Types of corrupt 
practice were prioritized and, finally, feasible strategies to 
address them were generated and discussed.
Stage 1: Literature Review 
We conducted a systematic review of the literature on 
corruption in the health sector in Anglophone West Africa. In 
brief, we searched PubMed, Researchgate, Hinari, and Google 
Scholar. Studies were included initially if they were: (1) 
published between 2007 and 2017; (2) focused on corruption 
within Anglophone West African countries; and (3) written 
in English or with an available English translation. The review 
identified 61 papers describing a variety of corrupt practices, 
with absenteeism, diversion of patients to private facilities, 
procurement irregularities, informal payments, and theft of 
drugs and supplies among the most prominent. From it we 
extracted the 50 papers covering Nigeria and reviewed them 
in detail to ascertain: (a) types of corrupt practices that had 
been reported specifically in the Nigerian health system and 
evidence of their impact on service users; (b) incentives/
disincentives (including policies and regulatory frameworks) 
for corrupt behaviour among frontline health workers and 
health facility managers; (c) strategies that constrain corrupt 
practices by frontline healthcare providers and their managers; 
and (d) roles of powerful organizations, lobbies, networks, 
associations, and influential individuals who may enable or 
obstruct the enforcement of existing legal and regulatory 
frameworks. This review was then used to inform the next 
step, consensus development. 
Stage 2: Nominal Group Technique Exercise
A Nominal Group Technique (NGT) was employed to 
build consensus among frontline health workers on corrupt 
practices that were most detrimental to the functioning of the 
health system. NGT is a group consensus-building method 
that aggregates the opinions of individuals with experience 
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of, or important perspectives on, the phenomenon. A NGT 
provides an opportunity to canvass diverse views and, through 
a series of steps, develop consensus.20 Its structured process 
helps to reduce the influence of dominant speakers in group 
interactions, ensuring that individual voices do not skew the 
debate. Hence, all participants are given an opportunity to 
contribute equally. 
Twenty-one frontline health workers (15 males and 
6 females) from Enugu state and the Federal Capital 
Territory Abuja participated in the NGT exercise. They were 
purposively selected to represent different categories of health 
workers in the three tiers of healthcare (primary, secondary, 
and tertiary). They included: medical doctors, pharmacists, 
nurses, midwives, radiographers, laboratory scientists, and 
physiotherapists. Signed informed consent was obtained from 
each participant before the exercise. The discussions were 
audio recorded, backed up with hand-written notes. A team 
of 3 experts with experience in using NGT for policy design 
facilitated different segments of the discussion.
The NGT exercise was conducted in Abuja, Nigeria, in 
April 2018 (Box 1). Participants first heard presentations of 
findings from the literature review and a summary of current 
debates on corruption and anticorruption strategies in health 
sectors of low- and middle-income countries. They were 
then briefed on the purpose of the study and the NGT was 
explained. Participants were asked to individually generate 
a list of manifestations of corruption (hereafter corrupt 
practices) they have witnessed or know to be occurring in 
Nigeria’s health sector (‘silent generation’). Contributions 
were made in a round robin style, going around the table 
three times. During each round, each participant was asked 
to mention only one corrupt practice from his/her list, which 
was written on a flipchart, noting any repetition. Participants 
were encouraged to simply describe it and not to debate how 
prevalent or problematic it was at this stage. Each idea received 
a score of ‘1’ if different from previous suggestions. At the end 
of the third round, a list of 49 corrupt practices was derived, 
and participants were asked to clarify some of the concepts 
and wording rather than discuss their reasoning behind the 
ideas, thus reducing the chance of unconscious bias. 
The initial list of 49 corrupt practices was refined and 
condensed by merging and linking similar ideas. Participants 
were asked to reflect whether the condensed list represented 
the true picture of practices identified and to include any 
practice that was missed. Having agreed on a comprehensive 
list of 19 distinct corrupt practices, each participant was 
asked to select 5 and to rank them (on index cards) from most 
important to least important, considering their significance 
and harm (prevalence and impact on health). Votes were 
entered into an Excel spreadsheet and the top 5 types of corrupt 
practices were automatically generated using an algorithm. 
Numerical scores were generated by multiplying number of 
votes by weights based on reverse order of rankings. Thus, if 
ten participants ranked absenteeism first among the top five, 
the weighted score would be 10 × 5 = 50. If 8 participants 
ranked procurement-related corruption in fifth position, the 
weighted score would be 8 × 1 = 8. The totals for each type of 
corruption were then summed. 
The aggregate initial rankings were presented to participants 
for discussion and clarification of inconsistent results. In the 
final stage, participants were asked to re-rank their original 
top-five ideas, this time, based on how easily they can be 
addressed (given existing political and institutional contexts). 
Their responses were again entered into an Excel spreadsheet 
and the summary scores computed. Changes in aggregate 
rankings were computed and fed back to participants. 
Stage 3: Stakeholder Workshop
We conducted a stakeholder workshop the following day with 
senior healthcare managers and policy-makers to validate 
the findings, to explore further the drivers of corruption 
in the health sector, and to operationalize measures to 
combat corruption among frontline health workers. Using a 
structured process of prioritizing with discussion, working 
within small groups, we focused on the manifestations of 
corruption. The workshop thus provided an opportunity 
for participants to reflect on: (1) the ranked list of corrupt 
practices among frontline health workers, (2) socioeconomic, 
political and institutional drivers of these corrupt practices, 
(3) anticorruption measures that have the potential to 
succeed, and how they could feasibly be implemented given 
existing policy and regulatory frameworks, and (4) powerful 
individuals or groups whose positionality could enable or 
obstruct enforcement of anticorruption measures. 
Twenty-five participants (19 male and 6 female), 
comprising senior healthcare managers and policy-makers 
from government organizations/agencies, and representatives 
from international organizations and bilateral agencies, 
attended the workshop. These included the Federal Ministry 
of Health, Enugu state Ministry of Health, FCT Department 
of Health, National Primary Health Care Development 
Agency, National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS), World 
Health Organization (WHO), and United States Agency 
for International Development, as well as representatives 
1. Introductions and background (10 minutes) – overall. 
2. Silent generation – (15 minutes)- participants write their list of 
corrupt practices on postcards without interacting with other 
participants.
3. Round Robin – 1 idea per person up to 3 rounds (no more) (30 
minutes) Facilitator write up suggested corruption types on a flip 
chart, research team members to write into computer.
4. Clarification of ideas with participants (20 minutes) – Facilitators 
condense ideas and transfer to a computer for slide presentation.
5. Re-present the condensed options as a list – condensed versions 
(5-10 minutes) up to 10.
6.  Participants write down top 5 options silently on a card (5 minutes).
7. Silent ranking – done individually, each participant ranks for ‘most 
important and most feasible to address’ (10 minutes).
8. Collect index cards– partners to add data to the computer 
(10-minute break for participants).
9.  Start of discussion while rankings are aggregated (20 to 45 minutes).
10. Re-ranking results – from original list (15 minutes).
11. Present results – display computer screen.
12. Final discussion – guided by facilitators.
Box 1. Nominal Group Process
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of 2 anti-graft agencies, the Independent Corrupt Practices 
Commission and Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission. 
The one-day workshop consisted of informative 
presentations, a group activity, and a plenary discussion. 
Having informed participants of the purpose of the study and 
objectives of the workshop (“to reflect on prevalent corrupt 
practices among frontline health workers in Nigeria” and “to 
identify practical and feasible interventions for curbing these 
practices”), the findings from the narrative literature review 
and NGT were presented. Participants were then assigned 
randomly to three groups (A, B, and C) for facilitated 
participatory discussion about drivers of specific corrupt 
practices and measures for mitigating or preventing their 
occurrence. The groups focused on the top 5 corrupt practices 
identified in the NGT process the previous day. Feedback 
from groups was followed by plenary discussion about the 
feasibility of implementation of suggested anti-corruption 
measures, and potential influence of powerful groups and 
individuals.
Findings from the workshop were synthesized and 
compared with findings from literature review. Consistencies 
and inconsistencies across methods are reported in subsequent 
sections of this paper.
Results
Literature Review 
Most of the 50 studies concerning Nigeria were published 
after 2010. The largest share involved quantitative surveys 
while a few made use of qualitative data from in-depth 
interviews, observations, documentary reviews and other 
exploratory methods. For the present study we focused 
primarily on the qualitative studies identified in that review 
as they provided insights into the drivers of corruption most 
relevant to our objectives, harnessing rich information from 
lived experiences of providers, their managers, and clients. 
Table 1 summarizes characteristics of the top five recurring 
corruption concerns. Only a few studies actually evaluated 
the measures proposed.17,21 We summarise the measures 
identified in Box 2.
Consensus Development Exercise 
The findings from the literature review were presented to 
participants as described above. Participants added several 
practices that had not featured prominently in the literature, 
including document forgery, falsifying information for private 
gain, favouritism/nepotism in employment, promotions and 
deployment, undertaking treatments beyond the expertise or 
authorisation of the practitioner, deliberate underpayment 
of medical staff, job purchasing and corruption in training, 
prioritizing activities that are beneficial for workers, failure 
of accountability for unfinished projects, and infiltration/
trading of counterfeit drugs. This discussion generated a list 
of 49 corrupt practices (Table 2).
The 49-item list was discussed among participants and 
facilitators and condensed into 19 corrupt/illicit practices by 
merging or removing duplicates and overlaps. Participants 
then ranked them in terms of which were most important, 
in terms of significance and harm, followed by feasibility 
of addressing them. The top five corrupt practices that 
emerged (with their weighted scores) were: absenteeism (53), 
procurement-related corruption (34), under-the-counter 
payments (33), health financing-related corruption (28), and 
employment-related corruption (26).
Table 1. Types of Corruption Reported in the Nigerian Health System
Corruption Type Manifestations Drivers
Bribery and informal 
payments
Bribes taken to let patients jump queues22; Give priority 
treatment to patients23; Charges for supposed free services24; 
Bribes taken to cover erring staff and fast-track promotion of 
health workers.25  
Normalization of bribery by service users who 
gain quicker services5; Prevalence of out-of-pocket 
payments26; Poor pay of health workers1; Absence of 
an automated system of payment.24
Absenteeism 
Health workers not turning up for work at all13; Turning up late27; 
Leaving workplace before closure time28; Deliberate idleness at 
workplace.12
Weak rules that check absenteeism27; Transport 
difficulties/geographical location of facility29; Poor pay 
of health workers to fund transport cost24; Political 
protection against sanctions25; Dual and private 
practice.30
Theft/diversion of money, 
drugs and medical supplies
Selling supplies for public consumption privately, and with extra 
cost31; Selling substandard products to patients while retaining 
quality ones for private sales27; Withholding free hospital 
supplies from patients and selling self-owned supplies in place 
of free supplies31; Embezzlement of healthcare funds.5 
Dearth and weak enforcement of existing consumer 
protection laws17; Prevalence of out-of-pocket 
payments26; Ignorance of service users.32  
Drugs and medical 
equipment procurement 
malpractices 
Supply of substandard products by contractors28; Political 
considerations in securing procurement contracts12; Illegal sales 
of supplies to facilities for private profits25; Releasing seized 
substandard consumables after collection of bribery33; Taking 
kickbacks to prescribe and sell a particular product to patients, 
even if not appropriate33; Impersonation of licences by non-
pharmacists.33 
Absence of consumer protection measures17; 
Weak enforcement of procurement laws33; Poor 
understanding of procurement processes by staff 
and poor record keeping and store management25; 
Inappropriate cordial relationships between health 
agencies and hospital management boards13; Weak 
monitoring mechanisms.33
Diversion of public facility 
patients to private facilities 
and vice-versa
Refer patients from public facilities to private facilities where 
they gain from exorbitant charges28; Use equipment in public 
facilities to treat private patients.34
Health workers’ poor pay29; Political protection of 
doctors.35
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After reflection and discussion of the ranked items, 
participants re-ranked the items. Table 3 shows the results of 
each round of ranking. In the second ranking, absenteeism 
(82) ranked highest. This was followed by under-the-table/
informal payments (71); employment-related corruption (59); 
health financing at facility level (54); and procurement-related 
corruption (42). There were some shifts between the ranking 
stages. Thus, while informal payments were considered less 
feasible to address in the first round of ranking, discussions 
highlighted strategies that may offer potential (with the 
rank moving from 3 to 2). Similarly, employment-related 
corruption was not initially seen as tractable given the need 
for a fundamental institutional change in regulations and 
enforcement mechanisms but, after debate, participants 
a. Whistle blowing: Tormusa and Idom recommended whistle blowing 
as a means to encourage reporting of misconduct, fraud and 
corruption, but it should be accompanied by effective protection for 
whistle-blowers.8
b. Strengthening audit systems: Vian recommended creation of fraud 
control units, training of internal auditors, and surveillance systems 
to tackle corruption, coupled with interventions to educate or change 
beliefs.10 
c. Sector-specific anti-corruption agency: The establishment of an 
independent agency to investigate and enforce efforts against 
overbilling, bribes, etc was suggested.1 
d. Strengthening community governance systems: Several authors 
identified lack of accountability as a factor encouraging corruption, 
leading to suggestions that citizens could act as watchdogs. Unlike 
many of the other suggestions, this was supported by evidence that 
regular community monitoring in public hospitals was effective in 
checking absenteeism.17 Mooketsane and Phirinyane pointed to weak 
governance and mismanagement of funds as key processes sustaining 
corruption in the health sector and so recommended involving 
churches in management of health facilities, arguing that their moral 
standards would reduce corruption.6 However, this is likely to depend 
strongly on context. 
e. Increase co-payments for free health services: It was suggested that 
informal payments could be displaced by formalising co-payment for 
free health services.17
f. Improved remuneration of health workers and adequate supply 
of work material/tools: Several authors note the low pay of health 
workers and advocate monetary incentives dissuade them from taking 
bribes,26,28 although some note that this should be accompanied by 
measures to ensure adequate and dependable supplies of equipment 
and commodities (particularly drugs). 
g. Publication of performance data: The need to monitor and supervise 
the activities of public health facilities to prevent diversion of funds, 
drugs and medical products cannot be overemphasized.1 
h. Strengthening procurement monitoring systems: These include 
increased surveillance of stores, improved staffing (including security 
personnel) and weekly/monthly review of records and inventory, 
coupled with improved hiring processes and monitoring of staff. 
Suggestions to tackle corruption in tendering processes included, use 
of (electronic) media in publicizing and updating tenders and supplies, 
deployment of management information systems in monitoring the 
flow of supplies, and regular internal and external audits. 
i. Other recommendations: Some authors highlighted the role of 
collective beliefs/norms/expectations regarding the giving and 
taking of bribes in Nigeria, and suggest that interventions that target 
addressing belief systems and norms are critical for countering health 
sector-related corruption.5 Others include awarding performance 
bonuses, legislation to make managers legally responsible for actions 
of subordinates, and regular monitoring to ascertain the official and 
actual fees paid by service users. 
Box 2. Suggested Approaches to Reducing Corruption reconsidered this (moving from fifth to third). Conversely, 
procurement-related corruption was de-prioritised when the 
strength of opposition from vested interests (powerful groups 
and actors) was discussed.
Stakeholder Workshop
The senior managers and policy-makers concurred with all 
the findings from the NGT but highlighted their real-life 
drivers and significance, and suggested some actionable steps 
to implement them. Below are the outcome of the reflections 
from the workshops sorted in their different groups (A, B, C).
Group A – Absenteeism and Under-the-Table Payment
Absenteeism was conceptualized broadly as being absent 
from the workplace, arriving late, and leaving before closing 
time. There was some debate about whether consciously not 
performing or refusing to perform tasks/duties when in the 
workplace was a form of absenteeism, with group members 
taking differing views. Participants agreed that it was 
widespread across the health sector but most prevalent within 
primary care and among more senior health workers – who 
were more often absent than the junior ones. Similarly, under-
the-table-payments were considered a problem at all levels 
of healthcare but most prevalent in secondary and primary 
levels of care. The practices involved included extra-billing of 
clients or unauthorized (‘illegal’) payments made at a range of 
service points in a health facility and the ‘parallel sale’ of drugs 
and other consumables to clients. 
Participants argued that weak governance, lack of 
supervision, poor attitude (often driven by the stresses of 
working in the system) and poor remuneration within the 
health system drove health workers to seek money in other 
ways, including absenteeism and under-the-table payments. 
Other drivers of absenteeism in primary care include 
underutilization of (low demand for) primary health centres 
for health services. However, health facility administrators 
and some other influential workers were considered to benefit 
from this type of corruption so it might be very difficult 
to facilitate change through measures that relied on their 
involvement. In these situations, stakeholders considered 
that top down or vertical interventions by the government, 
in the form of legislation and enforcement of rules would be 
necessary. 
Absenteeism was also facilitated by structural problems, 
such as poor transportation and the long distances that health 
workers often have to travel to work. Female health workers 
often had competing family responsibilities. Senior doctors 
(consultants in particular), regardless of gender, had high 
social status that led to expectations that they would provide 
financial support to relatives beyond what was possible on 
their official income, leading them to seek additional income 
streams (dual practice) that required absence from facilities. 
Stakeholders identified some technical remedies such as; 
clock-in/clock-out systems, linked to sanctions and rewards. 
Rewards might include cash incentives, display of pictures of 
especially committed staff, and greater flexibility in permitting 
authorised absences when needed. Structural interventions 
included improving the provision of accommodation and 
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transportation for health workers and providing better 
equipment in health facilities, which would have direct 
benefits for patients beyond any impact on staff satisfaction. 
Views on public-private partnerships, such as those that would 
permit health workers to operate in both sectors in the same 
facilities, differed. Some saw this as a way to retain them in 
the facilities while others were concerned that it would create 
complex arrangements that would be prone to exploitation 
and abuse, thereby increasing corruption. As the participants 
discussed the feasibility of introducing these interventions, 
many, questions were raised but not answered about what 
changes would be needed in funding, policies, and legislation. 
Participants found it difficult to see how they would be able to 
convince authorities to make any changes, given the potential 
opposition they would face for uncertain personal or political 
benefit. 
Discussions about under-the-table payments included 
several bottom up approaches. Increasing patient involvement 
could, it was thought, empower them by virtue of improved 
knowledge and strengthening the voice of service users, 
especially in relation to official prices of medical consumables 
and services. Stakeholders also proposed increasing choice, 
allowing patients to switch consultants and healthcare teams 
when irregularities occur. It was also suggested that costing 
and dispensing of consumables be decentralised, with trusted 
and reliable reporting platforms being established. 
Reducing under-the-table-payments was also identified as 
an important step in increasing revenue in health facilities, 
creating an incentive for health centre management teams to 
stamp this out. Again, however, the group thought that top 
down mechanisms would be necessary and would include 
audits, new legislation to support transparency in costing 
and dispensing consumables, protection for whistleblowing, 
and stiff sanctions for defaulters. Given the financial benefit 
that these could create for the health system, the participants 
considered that these would be more likely to gain buy-in 
from senior members of the government (in comparison to 
the suggestions around absenteeism). 
Group B – Procurement-Related Corrupt Practices
The second group discussed procurement-related corruption, 
much of which related to the distribution and theft of 
pharmaceuticals. A range of actors was identified as involved, 
including sales representatives, doctors, auditors and 
pharmacists. It was believed that these activities required a 
network of complicit actors. 
Participants contended that curbing this form of corruption 
required that the procurement system be fully digitalized 
with effective recording, monitoring and feedback systems. 
They also suggested that improving clients’ awareness of 
essential medicines list and prices, as well as institutionalizing 
sanctions against offenders. Other potential anticorruption 
measures include: promoting a drug-revolving fund 
system, improving the tendering process by having multiple 
simultaneous submission and using limited access tendering 
boxes. The introduction of Information and communications 
Table 2. Corrupt Practices Generated From the Round Robin Session
1 Unhealthy practices in employment of health workers 26 Inappropriate exemptions of health services 
2 Unlawful receipt of money from patients 27 Connivance with patients for personal gain 
3 Diversion of patients from public hospitals to private facilities 28 Undue reimbursement or claims 
4 Impersonation of doctors by other health workers 29 Playing politics with patients 
5 Inappropriate prescribing 30 Hoarding of bed-space for personal patients 
6 Procurement of illegal drugs 31 Overpricing drugs
7 Procurement of equipment that are not needed 32 Invoicing fraud
8 Favouritism/Nepotism 33 Mal-distribution of health workers 
9 Bringing private patients into public hospitals and charging them as private 
patients 
34 Delay in reporting data as required 
10 Negligence of patients 35 Increasing hospital bills without commensurate services 
11 Diversion of medical supplies to private facilities 36 Stealing or exchanging babies for fee 
12 Use of proxy patients 37 Giving and taking kickbacks 
13 Requesting for payments for free services 38 Falsification of data 
14
Protecting members of professional bodies even when they have committed 
crimes
39 Refusal to attend to patients based on financial constraints 
15 Provision of fake documentation 40 Refusal to stepdown acquired knowledge 
16 Over-budgeting 41 Not following procurement procedures to get supplies 
17 Giving and taking kickbacks 42 Poor attitude of health workers 
18 Lateness to work/absenteeism 43 Late arrival to work 
19 Dual appointments 44 Deliberate late release of funds 
20 Use of hospital vehicles for private businesses 45 Poor leadership 
21 Falsification of results for private gain 46 Theft of consumables 
22 Printing of fake receipts 47 Delay in payments of health workers 
23 Procurement of fake drugs 48 Sell of substandard medicines 
24 Ghost workers 49 Lack of funding and no proper accounting systems 
25 Sales of personal consumables in public facilities 
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technology for proper data management and monitoring 
the flow of supplies was also considered necessary to 
check for procurement corruption. Measures that would 
encourage institutions to adhere to procurement rules and 
whistleblowing policies were also identified as important. 
However, participants all agreed that most measures would 
require new legislation, imposing a vertical approach. Some 
horizontal measures considered feasible include measures to 
help patients – understand pricing systems and creation of 
facility based committees to oversee procurement, usage, and 
supply of medical consumables. Such committees should have 
representation by patients and involve staff, especially those 
with high moral standards and self-discipline. Nevertheless, 
the suggested horizontal measures all would require enabling 
vertical ones, especially legislation, to operate. This was 
considered challenging.
Group C – Corrupt Practices Related to Employment and 
Health Financing 
The third group discussed employment- and health financing-
related corrupt practices. Examples include: malpractice 
perpetuated by health maintenance organizations (HMOs) 
and service providers within the NHIS such as irregular 
reimbursement of fee-for-service by HMOs; billing HMOs/
NHIS for services not provided to clients; extra-billing of 
insured clients; lack of update of enrolee lists by HMOs; and 
hoarding of drugs and false reporting of stock-outs of NHIS 
drugs in health facilities. Others mentioned included issuing 
fake receipts to clients and failure to release budgeted funds 
to health facilities. These practices, considered as involving 
very powerful groups and persons, were also said to be driven 
mainly by weak governance and regulatory oversight of 
NHIS, poor/unpredictable budgets for the health sector, and 
poor planning and prioritization. 
Suggested strategies for curbing employment-related 
corruption mostly involved regulatory measures enacted 
and enforced by high-level authorities. Thus, vacancies 
should be advertised and the best applicants selected, rather 
than as is often the case using patronage; conducting staff 
audits using benchmarks for competence; deploying health 
workers appropriately; and ensuring a sustainable supply, 
with younger health workers being mentored and rising 
through ranks on the basis of their expertise. These measures 
were seen as creating a merit-based system that outlives the 
immediate future. Such an approach should curb irregularities 
as incompetent workers would become frustrated with the 
system, creating a deterrent for unqualified persons yet to be 
employed. 
The only horizontal measures, involving different institutions 
and actors, and civil society groups, were empowerment of 
communities to demand deployment of health workers that 
have the skills required to meet their health needs. Proposals 
to tackle corruption in health financing were dominated by 
suggestions to improve efficiency of the NHIS through better 
regulation of HMOs, accreditation and improved oversight 
of service providers, annual updates of enrolee lists, and 
strengthening accountability of service providers to enrolees. 
Suggested approaches include detailing of services provided to 
Table 3. Results From NGT Voting Exercise With Frontline Health Workers
Condensed List of 19 Corrupt Practices (2nd Listed)
Initial Ranking - Based on Significance and 
Harm (Weighted Scores)
 Re-ranking – Based on Feasibility to Address 
(Weighted Scores)
1. Employment-related corruption 1. Absenteeism (53) 1. Absenteeism (82) 
2. Under the table payments 2. Procurement-related corruption (34) 2. Under-the-table/informal payments (71)
3. Diversion of patients from public hospitals to 
private facilities
3. Under-the-table/informal payments (33) 3. Employment-related corruption (59)
4. Procurement of illegal drugs 4. Health financing-related corruption (28) 4. Health financing corruption at facility level (54)
5. Procurement-related corruption 5. Employment-related corruption (26) 5. Procurement-related corruption (42)
6. Bringing private patients into public hospitals 
and charging them as private patients
7. Negligence of patients
8. Diversion of medical supplies to private facilities
9. Use of proxy patients 
10.	 Requesting for payments for free services
11. Protecting members of professional bodies even 
when they have committed crimes
12. Over-budgeting 
13. Giving and taking kickbacks 
14. Absenteeism 
15. Dual appointments 
16. Provision of fake documentation 
17. Procurement of equipment that are not needed 
18. Health financing at facility level 
19. Lateness to work 
Abbreviation: NGT, Nominal Group Technique.
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clients on an invoice which must be signed by the client before 
forwarding to HMOs for reimbursement; establishment of 
effective channels for client complaints and feedback to NHIS; 
and public display of pricing list of services.
In summary, excluding employment-related corruption, 
the most promising anti-corruption strategies are those that 
could be implemented using both top down and horizontal 
approaches (at the grassroots level) and involve collective 
agreements and actions by key actors influential at the service 
delivery level. While there was perception that initiatives 
by grassroots organisations or movements can play a major 
role, if they are to rise to the challenge of tackling corruption 
they will have to be strengthened. It is thus important for 
civil society organisations, non-governmental organisations, 
and other bodies with a stake in combatting corruption to 
encourage and lead grassroots efforts to undertake these 
strategies.
Summary, Limitations, and Outlook
Corruption in the Nigerian health system is commonplace 
and a serious issue but, too often, is placed in the “too 
difficult” tray and the evidence on its scale and nature and 
on responses that have been adopted is often fragmentary. 
We have shown that it is possible to reach agreement among 
frontline health workers and policy-makers about specific 
types of corruption that are significantly harmful yet could 
be feasibly engaged. Our approach was participative, listening 
to those who have first-hand experience of this phenomenon. 
With them, we were able to develop a list of five priorities 
for action. These are: (1) absenteeism; (2) under-the-table/
informal payments; (3) employment-related corruption; (4) 
health financing corruption; and (5) procurement-related 
corruption. These were broadly consistent with what we 
had found in the literature.8,12,26,31,34 Thus, there are accounts 
of procurement-related corruption and health financing 
corruption driven by political factors with involvement of 
senior and top health managers in Nigeria.12,31 Absenteeism 
by health workers has also been reported in several parts 
of the country, with sickness and poor social and physical 
environment identified as underlying factors.36,37 There is 
also evidence of informal payments in Nigeria, specifically in 
relation to malaria treatment.26
However, we went beyond simply creating a ranked list of 
problems. Policy-makers who are aware of the political and 
economic realities of the Nigerian context, appraised each 
type of corruption to generate potential feasible measures 
that can be implemented to reduce or stop the listed types of 
corruption.
One surprising lesson can be learnt from our approach 
and findings. Corruption in Nigeria is often conceived to be 
grand embezzlement and/or heavy pilfering of public funds 
by high ranking government officials. Yet our findings reveal 
widespread everyday corruption involving frontline health 
workers (eg, doctors, nurses, pharmacists, accountants, etc), 
whose actions/inactions have direct and serious consequences 
for the delivery of healthcare. Some earlier studies tend to 
discuss these types of corruption as challenges facing the 
health sector.26,36 Our approach to identifying and discussing 
the types of corruption explicitly consider the practices as 
corruption and helped raised consciousness that perpetrators 
are often frontline staff. 
We do not deny that large scale embezzlement happens, 
or that it has significant impacts on health outcomes, but 
frontline health workers as well as policy-makers realize that 
such types of corruption are possibly beyond their influence. 
Crucially, health workers believe that there are feasible 
solutions that can be implemented at the grassroot level. Such 
measures avoid the legislative inertia that would make many 
top-down anti-corruption strategies challenging. 
Our study has several limitations. First, it was not feasible 
to include health workers from all regions of Nigeria. With 
only 50 participants (including health workers and policy-
makers), we may not have captured the entire spectrum of 
corruption prevalent in Nigeria and we may have given undue 
prominence to corrupt practices dominant in the places from 
which participants were drawn. Future studies could replicate 
this study in other regions of the country to see if similar 
or more diverse forms of corruption will be identified. Our 
study was exploratory and was unable to examine in-depth, 
the specific forms of corruption identified. Further research 
using qualitative methods such as in-depth interviews and 
focus group discussions would help to understand in more 
depth the drivers of various forms of corruption and their 
dynamics.
However, this is the first study in the region to employ 
structured consensus building to prioritise action on forms 
of corruption, taking account of what is feasible. It was not 
obvious that this would have been possible at the outset given 
the sensitivities involved. In this way it offers a means by which 
researchers and policy-makers in other low and middle income 
countries can begin the process of tackling corruption. It is 
important to stress the contribution of engaging in a process 
of consensus building. It would have been possible to derive 
the final list of priorities simply from the literature. However, 
by engaging in discussion, participants changed their views 
about what was possible, identifying and supporting potential 
measures they would once have discounted. The approach we 
took also enabled those at the frontline and those at the apex 
of the system to engage with one another in a constructive 
manner that otherwise does not occur. 
Our experience provides support for targeted, pragmatic 
approaches to governance and anti-corruption in health 
systems policy. Such approaches are gaining ground in 
other sectors (education and industrial policy) where, under 
the rubric of developmental governance,38 or cumulative 
incrementalism,39 actors are seeking ways to intervene “within 
the grain,”40 that is by taking account of the ways in which the 
economic, political and social structures limit the potential 
for action. Such approaches recognise that the long-standing 
search for comprehensive solutions to corruption in society, or 
more narrowly in the health sector, has not, in general, proven 
fruitful. In health, the enormity of the task, the multiplicity 
of actors involved, and the limited institutional capacity for 
reform have led to corruption being seen as impossible to 
tackle at the current stage of development. Politicians in many 
countries have entered government with a stated intention to 
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do something about it but failed. This was borne out in our 
discussions with key stakeholders. There was widespread 
agreement about the need for stronger systems of governance, 
accountability, and transparency, but the practical steps 
that needed to be taken remained elusive. In contrast, by 
focusing on specific manifestations of corruption, those who 
participated in this exercise were able to identify a number 
of measures that did seem feasible and offered potential for 
success. In a number of cases, individuals who began the 
process with a degree of scepticism about what could be 
achieved changed their minds.
Obviously, the ideas generated now need to be further 
operationalised in policies and interventions that must 
be evaluated, not least because of the risk of unintended 
consequences. Thus, while some measures (eg, flexible 
working conditions and improved accommodation/transport 
for health workers) seem relatively straightforward, even if 
requiring additional resources, others (eg, the introduction of 
sanctions and rewards for dealing with absenteeism) will need 
to be carefully designed and evaluated to ensure that they are 
achieving their intended goals.
Some of the measures proposed lie within the scope of 
district/local authorities, who have the power to implement 
them. Some other measures require relatively simple changes, 
such as improved documentation of financial flows. However, 
others require action at a higher level. Participants supported 
managers and policy-makers working concert to promote 
appropriate legislation.41 Jackson and Köbis suggest that 
a multipronged approach that will counter both vertical 
and horizontal pressures to be corrupt and mobilize local 
action will be more effective in fighting corruption within 
communities and organisations.42 For instance, effective 
feedback mechanisms (such as phone-in centres or hotlines) 
for patients to report informal/under-the-table payments 
would require supportive ‘formal’ health financing or 
consumer protection policies. Similarly, whistleblowing would 
only produce results if policy and political environments 
enable enforcement of sanctions. 
The identification of practical measures that can be taken 
should not, however, divert attention from the larger issues 
underpinning the persistence of corruption, including 
inadequate resources for the health sector.12,30,43,44 Inadequate 
government funding leads to low wages for health workers, 
poor infrastructure and basic amenities, and lack of 
equipment and consumables in health facilities, all creating 
the conditions for corrupt practices. Onwujekwe et al found 
that health workers who demanded informal payments from 
clients for treatment of malaria, which was supposed to be 
free, did so to augment their salaries and generate internal 
revenue to keep the facility running.26 In addition to low wages, 
health workers in the public sector lack materials (including 
medicines) and equipment to deliver quality healthcare.44,34 
Some health workers are expected to work in health facilities 
for several years as unpaid volunteers.45 Addressing these 
issues will require structural changes and better resourcing of 
the health system which need to be addressed over a longer 
time period.
Despite the lack of evidence on the effect of transparency 
and accountability initiatives on corruption, there is some 
evidence that horizontal approaches involving communities 
monitoring and participating in decision-making has led to 
improvements in local governance and health outcomes.46 
There is a clear need to empower patients. One explanation 
for the persistence of informal payments, developed by Gaal 
and McKee,47 is that they represent a means of informal 
exit (INXIT), in settings where patients lack both exit (to 
alternative services) and voice (redress). Hoffman and Patel 
show how a failure by patients to question medical staff who 
accept corrupt practices encourages corruption in the health 
sector.5 However, this will require considerable efforts to 
strengthen civil society groups and create a political space 
where the voice of multiple actors can be heard. 
In summary, although only a first step, this exercise 
presented in the paper has shown that it is possible to bring 
together people from across the health sector in Nigeria to 
discuss corruption, and to conclude that some solutions are 
possible, even if it will take some time to fix the underlying 
problems. We hope to take this research further, building on 
a more detailed understanding of the drivers of the corrupt 
practices identified, while exploring the feasibility and 
effectiveness of the solutions suggested. We hope that those 
studying corruption in other countries will find our approach 
useful and utilize it to identify and engage the prevalent 
damaging types of corruption in their contexts. Countries 
in the same region with Nigeria, especially Anglophone 
West African countries, may build on the findings from our 
systematic reviews (see full details in Onwujekwe et al),48 to 
begin to explore and prioritise the top health sector corruption 
prominent in literature in their countries.
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